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Abstract
The so-called crisis of representation has formed the theoretical framework of many studies on media and democracy of
the past thirty years. Many researches have highlighted the crisis of legitimacy and credibility of the ‘traditional’ parties
(Katz & Mair, 2018) and communication was considered, at the same time, one of the causes of acceleration towards
post-representative politics (Keane, 2013) but also an indispensable tool for re-connecting citizens to politics. Various phe-
nomena have developed within this framework: a) the birth of political aggregations as a result of mobilization in the
digital ecosystem; b) the development of digital platforms for democratic participation; c) the birth of parties defined as
‘digital’ or ‘platform’; and d) the growing centrality of digital political activism, both as a phenomenon within the digital
communicative ecosystem (also in the context of social media) and as a result of the transformation of social movements.
This article studies the role of platform parties as a space for the emergence of authoritarian tendencies (hyper-leadership)
but also as an organizational opportunity for the development of new forms of digital activism. In particular, the article
presents a research on the use of digital platforms (and their political and organizational consequences) by political parties
in Italy, France, and Spain. The study shows the relationships between the evolution of digital ecosystems and the way in
which political organization is organised, also highlighting how the new forms ofmobilization and aggregation have opened
up different yet interconnected public spaces.
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1. Introduction
In this article, we try to highlight the relationships be-
tween the development of new organizational forms of
politics (such as the so-called platform parties) and dig-
ital activism which, in turn, has intertwined both with
forms of hyper-leadership (such as occurred in some
forms of populism) with the emergence of reticular and
horizontal political aggregations. The complexmutations
involving the public sphere—to the point that the same
expression seems to be declined with different mean-
ings by different authors—are in turn closely intercon-
nected with the now evident centrality of digital commu-
nication ecosystems. In this article, we started from the
crisis (presumed but nevertheless strongly perceived) of
the centrality of political parties in “post-representative
politics” (Keane, 2009, 2013) which finds in the commu-
nicative ecosystems important actors for activating and
speeding up that transformation. We then highlighted
the evolution of plebiscitary appeal, closely connected
both to the re-emergence of populisms and to the trans-
formation of intermediate political bodies itself: The ten-
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dencies towards leadership, the substantial marginaliza-
tion of activists and sympathizers, and even the develop-
ment of authoritarian ‘leaderism’ are elements that dis-
tinguish this transformation. The cases of France, Italy,
and Spain—despite their respective historical, cultural,
and institutional peculiarities—constitute an important
territory of analysis. In these countries, in fact, different
(sometimes even contradictory) phenomena emerged
which are located on the complex ridge of relations be-
tween populism, new forms of digital activism, and ‘plat-
formization’ processes of the public sphere. The rela-
tionships between digital parties, platform parties, and
networked parties—starting from the three countries
analysed—constitute an important test for social and po-
litical research. In this scenario, the transformation of
the public sphere is considered as a frame element that
at the same time impacts the evolution of the political
parties—and, more generally, the forms of mobilisation
of politics—and is influenced by the transformation of
the logic of representation.
2. A Crisis of Party in Post-Representative Democracy?
The repeated use of the term ‘crisis of parties’ is a key fea-
ture of the wider process of transformation of 20th cen-
tury political forms and, in particular, the protest against
the political representation proper of liberal democra-
cies (Keane, 2009; Merkel, 2014, 2018; Tormey, 2015).
The growing distrust of the role of political parties is
part of the progressive overcoming of party democracy
and the crisis of legitimising the forms of democracy in
its ‘minimal’ and ‘procedural’ version, with the transi-
tion to an audience democracy that to a large extent
recalls the Schumpeterian theory of democracy (Green,
2010; Körösényi & Pakulski, 2012; Manin, 1997). Within
this process of transforming democracy, plebiscitarism
marks the overcoming of collective actors as interme-
diaries of democracy, in fact substantiating the demo-
craticmethod in themere possibility for voters to choose,
and legitimise by voting, the leaders who govern them
(Schumpeter, 2003). The challenges to the representa-
tion and role of political parties arise in discussion of the
political representation proper to liberal democracies,
opening the way for different developments of plebisci-
tarism, from leader democracy to the most radical forms
of populist audience democracy (De Blasio & Sorice,
2018; Urbinati, 2019). In the changing models of repre-
sentation in the post ‘party democracy era,’ the electoral
dimension alone does not guarantee the legitimacy of
democracy but only enables the ‘rule of themajority,’ un-
derestimating the forms of trust, identity, and political
project which comprise democracy. Furthermore, con-
sideration of the different evolutions undertaken by rep-
resentative democracy has led to hypothesised transfor-
mations in which the plebiscite dimension undermines
the very foundations of representative democracy, due
to the transformation of the same procedural rule of
the majority (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018), highlighting the
possibility of regression or rupture in democracy’s path
(Crouch, 2003; della Porta, 2013; Runciman, 2018). The
rights of freedom, the rights of participation, the con-
trols on power, the forms of self-government, and the
horizontal accountability are in fact necessary condi-
tions to avoid the transformation into defective democ-
racy, in the various forms this can take, and particu-
larly in predicting an illiberal populist democracy and
ones with a technocratic or authoritarian nature (Merkel,
2004, 2018; Pappas, 2019). Starting from the de-freezing
of traditional cleavage politics, after 1989, the ‘hostile’
climate towards political parties developed from diver-
gent perspectives. On the one hand, the role of parties
in advanced democracies has been contested for the
benefit of a post-representative politics, where the in-
termediation of traditional forms of integration is op-
posed by a new protagonism from citizens. They do not
limit themselves to the election period but monitor the
work of institutions, up to taking on the character of
a “counter-democracy” based on the power of control,
veto, and judgement (Keane, 2009, 2013; Rosanvallon,
2008). On the other hand, parties as interpreters of
the plural political conflict are instead challenged in the
name of a ‘holistic’ conception of the political commu-
nity that coincides with the ‘majority,’ in a perspective of
“direct representation” that is typical of the populist ver-
sion of democracy (Diehl, 2019; Müller, 2016; Urbinati,
2019). Instead of a rereading of society capable of in-
terpreting and guiding the complexity of the transforma-
tion of democracy’s social bases, the conditions are cre-
ated for politicising dissatisfaction with democracy’s ‘un-
fulfilled promises.’ These mainly concern the tension be-
tween democracy as ‘an ideal’ and democracy as ‘a pro-
cedure,’ the persistence of conflicting interests of mul-
tiple social groups instead of a ‘monistic’ people, the
greater impact of the representation of interests com-
pared to political representation, the failure to overcome
the elite in representative democracy, the persistence
of areas of social and political regulation which democ-
racy has failed to enter, the role of invisible powers, and
the presence of cronyism (Bobbio, 1984, pp. 7–8; Müller,
2016, pp. 62–63).
The problem of parties is therefore the broader prob-
lemof political representation, sincewhile liberal democ-
racy mainly develops its procedural aspect, the fact re-
mains that governing and regulating do not amount to
representing (Tormey, 2015, p. 79) and the perception of
this disconnect feeds dissatisfactionwith the actors of lib-
eral democracy. On the one hand, there is no possibility
of voting for the future, for a society with which people
can identify and which legitimises the unequal distribu-
tion of power between the governing and the governed.
On the other hand, in parallel, the established processes
of personalising politics and leadership create the condi-
tions which now result in people trusting new political
entrepreneurs, leading outsiders who become the main
‘confidants’ of the masses and ‘interpreters’ of criticism
of the political system and its establishment. The appear-
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ance of a crisis of representation involving political par-
ties is not new in democracy’s path and can occur in dif-
ferent cases within the relationship between moderni-
sation and democratisation. During the transformation
processes of societies and democracies, ruptures may
arise as a result of unorganisedmasses entering the elec-
toral circuit, in the presence of political and party sys-
tems crises, as part of a process of personalization of poli-
tics, and finally as a reaction to the cartel parties systems’
weakened accountability and responsiveness and power
without legitimacy (Roberts, 2015).
In late modernity societies, the progressive weak-
ening of traditional intermediary organizations and the
growing personalization of power accompany the pro-
cesses of redefining the social bases of democracy, the
institutional dynamics of redistributing regulatory power
to supranational institutions, the multifaceted reality of
globalisation, and the development of media influence.
This creates the structure of opportunities for leaders
and parties that challenge traditional party politics to
emerge (Meny & Surel, 2002, p. 21). In this scenario, can
parties still be considered indispensable tools for democ-
racy? Or is the political party the redundant burden of
a system that has definitively embarked on the slippery
slope of post-representation and post-democracy?
Mainstream parties’ loss of relevance within the
public sphere in advanced democracies (Dalton &
Wattenberg, 2000; Webb, Farrell, & Holliday, 2002) can
be interpreted as a ‘crisis’ only if the particular balance
of organizational models and functions in the period of
party democracy is taken as the paradigm for evaluating
political forms. The vast empirical data on distrust of par-
ties, the falling number of members, and the increased
volatility of electoral choices confirm that the actor-party
is irreversibly condemned to lose its central role on the
political stage (Dalton, 2004; Mair, 2013; van Biezen,
Mair, & Poguntke, 2012). The categories underlying the
phenomenology of the crisis of parties ultimately refer to
the loss of expressive capacity for parties “without firm
social roots” (Poguntke, 2002). The key feature of the de-
bate refers to the changed relationship between citizens
and parties, connected to the loss of trust and belonging
generated by collective identity incentives. Participation
in specific objectives, active involvement based on a sys-
temof individual values, and declining identificationwith
parties constitute some of the most relevant challenges
to representative democracy. Despite the crisis’ broad
phenomenology, it could be objected that to date there
are no functional equivalents to parties in the capacity
to structure political conflict and ensure that democra-
cies function, and this decline actually refers to a type of
organization—the mass integration party—while under-
estimating the capacity to adapt and transform (Dalton,
Farrell, & McAllister, 2011). The crisis of parties is there-
fore attributable to the more general compatibility of
partisanshipwith the forms taken by post-representative
democracy (White & Ypi, 2016) and to parties’ relevance
in the contemporary public sphere regarding the type of
functions performed and organizations adopted in trans-
forming the linkage between politics and society.
3. Plebiscitarian Politics and New Political Parties
The relationship between the entities operating in post-
integration mass democracies changes, enabling a pub-
lic sphere to emerge that is no longer colonised by the
logic of the party as the only pervasive actor. However,
the party itself is part of a civil society ranging from
the active role of individual citizens, to new social move-
ments, to a wide range of voluntary non-state and
non-economic associations, including the independent
media itself (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Habermas, 1990).
In this re-opened public sphere, the party no longer
holds its hegemonic role, let alone the monopolistic one
of “gatekeeper” (Caramani, 2017, p. 59), and within it
there also begins a process of differentiating the differ-
ent intra-party faces comprising the organization (Gauja,
2017, p. 27).
The party becomes a network itself, divests some
functions traditionally associated with its internal orga-
nization and geographical structuring by organizational-
bureaucratic penetration, and maintains the formation
of the ruling class, the selection of candidates, and the
procedural-electoral part (Gunther & Diamond, 2001).
If these functions belong to the organization of the party
proper, then there are also a series of associative real-
ities which, though not expressly part of the party’s in-
stitutional activities, nevertheless fall within the political
network that shares a common process of political iden-
tification. The crisis of parties is, therefore, more prop-
erly a process of transforming the functions they per-
form in relation to the changing social bases of democ-
racy and the greater relevance that individual political
actors assume at the expense of parties and collective
identities, with the changing behaviour of voters and
elected officials within the political sphere (Karvonen,
2010). The relationship between personalization and pol-
itics not only refers to the relationship between voters
and leaders but also involves the personalization of lead-
ership and, in particular, the convergence between con-
centration of power and the relevance of the mono-
cratic leadership within groups and institutions (Blondel
& Thiébault, 2010; Garzia, 2014). This phenomenon con-
cerns the leader’s autonomy from the party, both in the
organizational hierarchy and as a representative of the
ruling party, and, finally, the personalization of election
campaigns, conducted on the basis of the leader candi-
date’s choices and personality (Poguntke &Webb, 2005).
Not only, then, do the erosion of traditional cleavages
and the new pervasiveness of mass communication cre-
ate favourable conditions for disintermediating the re-
lationship between voters and politicians but the en-
tire institutional framework also favours the growth of
the leader’s role. The resulting process shifts account-
ability from the collegiate and collective dimension to
the individual one, while public resources are simultane-
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ously made available to the leader to “invest” in build-
ing personal consensus (McAllister, 2007, p. 572; Rahat
& Kenig, 2018, p. 129). From the perspective of trans-
forming democracy, these dynamics do not determine
the end of political representation, because the person-
alization of top leadership continues to be embedded in
a neo-elitist model of democracy. Here, the power of the
elite is replaced by the power of the leader (Higley &
Pakulski, 2008; Pakulski, 2012) and the party becomes
the tool of the leader (and not vice versa). In otherwords,
it is a process which, starting from the catch-all party,
confirms a common tendency for political systems and
parties in advanced democracies whereby “the leaders
become the party and the party is nothing but its leaders”
(Katz & Mair, 2002, p. 126). This democracy, however,
remains exposed to the paradox of leader democracy,
whereby the personalised leader can count on the legiti-
macy deriving from the disintermediated consensus, i.e.,
a growing plebiscitarian tie between leader and electors,
but his power is simultaneously weakened by a lower
capacity for regulation due to the lost primacy of poli-
tics when exercising decision-making power. This picture
has radicalised since the ‘Great Recession’ in 2008, due
to the scarcity of resources and the constraints imposed
by austerity policies. It has led to national governments
weakening further in terms of the nation-state’s diffi-
culty in coping with global economic and financial crises
and the depoliticisation of spheres of public regulation,
especially when attributing decision-making power to
non-majority institutions (Raniolo &Morlino, 2017). The
picture that emerges is one of political systems where
leaders are used up quickly, not only in the event of
electoral defeat, but also when they manage to reach
government positions. The plebiscitarianism inherent in
personalization of top leadership is an expression of
a transformed configuration of the political party with
its power concentrated in the leader. Here, we can ob-
serve the transition from a labour-intensive to a capital-
intensive mode (i.e., a decreasing role of membership
and a growing role of professional staff in electoral cam-
paigns), verticalized decision-making processes, the de-
clining relevance ofmiddlemanagers, increased financial
resources directly available to the leader, and cronyism
developing within the party due to non-top personaliza-
tion within the organization, especially in locally elected
parties (Ignazi, 2017; Musella, 2018). It is precisely in
these transformation processes that tensions arise be-
tween the procedural dimension of democracy and the
increased relevance, trust, and legitimacy borne by in-
dividual political interpreters. If, on the one hand, the
conditions are created for personalised leadership and
the transition from party democracy to forms of leader
democracy, on the other hand the leadership tends to
see its trust capital rapidly deteriorate. This typology
includes different political forms and cannot be traced
back solely to the personal party or the party of the
charismatic leader (Blondel & Thiébault, 2010; Viviani,
2017). Although the development trajectory of top lead-
ership personalization is not unidirectional, some recur-
ring variables act on it. In particular, it is necessary to
consider the effects of the institutional set-up, i.e., all
those rules, mechanisms, and institutions that shift cen-
trality from parties to leaders, the effects of the mass
media’s role in the dual perspective of personalization
as a focus on the activities of individual politicians and
personalization as “media privatisation,” i.e., a shift of at-
tention to their extra-political characteristics, and, finally,
the effects of the degree of personalization on political
behaviour. This in fact corresponds to the more general
personalization of politics, for both politicians and voters
(Rahat & Sheafer, 2007, pp. 66–68). In reinforcing person-
alization, not only do ‘exogenous’ variables act on par-
ties, but their use of personalised leadership constitutes
a ‘strategy’ implemented bymainstreamparties to tackle
the deficit of trust. They democratise the procedures for
selecting the leader, as in the use of primaries, to counter
the discredit and distrust of the political class with the re-
legitimisation of a leader chosenby a broader selectorate
than the party oligarchies, extending participation to the
entire potential electorate (Pilet & Cross, 2015).
The prospect of a transition from party democracy to
leader democracy calls into question the various forms
plebiscite disintermediation can also take in the con-
text of new political entities. Here, the organization of
the filter between grassroots electors and membership
and elected officials is overcome by substituting a leader
who redefines the form of democratic representation
and the forms themselves of the new parties. In fact,
we are not dealing with a post-representative dimension
of politics but are gradually moving away from the ag-
gregation and articulation of interests typical of mass
political parties to reach a system where the leader re-
ceives authorisation to govern, without the objective
of ‘representation’ but with a free mandate that lets
him create the people and move them in one direction,
making leadership the very essence of representation
(Körösényi, 2005, p. 377). In this sense, traditional politi-
cal representation is transformed and the representative
claim becomes increasingly important, i.e., that made di-
rectly by the leader (and the staff supporting his action),
whose performance renders him the leading actor and
not just a representative agent, moreover, with recog-
nition that is not bound to a pre-established audience
(Saward, 2010, pp. 66–67). In the transformation of par-
ties, and even more so in digital parties, the leader plays
a central in synthesising and symbolically expressing a
social whole that is inherently fragmented and weakly
institutionalised. In this sense, the hyper-leader of the
digital parties makes use of disintermediation tools of
the new and old media, conveying his image and act-
ing as an “external object” that promotes the sense of
community and makes bonds of solidarity possible be-
tween the group’s real and virtual members (Gerbaudo,
2019, pp. 146–147). It is, however, a question of dis-
tinguishing the processes of personalization as well as
the forms that plebiscite disintermediation takes in the
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various challenges facing liberal democracy. On the one
hand, as Mair (2002) proposes, the leader democracy
cannot be identified as a partyless democracy, which in
the name of directism goes beyond parties and produces
anti-partyism as a relevant part of a political identity in-
evitably oriented towards the emergence of a populist
model of representation and plebiscite democracy. On
the other hand, the leader democracy continues to op-
erate within a representative politics from a perspective
of democratic elitism, with representation and delega-
tion concentrated in the leader. Meanwhile, the “con-
stituents,” the voting citizens, remain “reactive,” in that
they can only play a role at election time or through
the ability to exercise “eye” control (Green, 2010, p.
125), i.e., as spectator-judges able to observe politi-
cians’ behaviour via the media. In this context, the chal-
lenges to political representation emerge, now in the
form of participatory and decision-making perspectives
of democratisation of democracy in the various forms as-
sumed by populism.
4. Populism and Digital Movement Parties in France,
Italy, and Spain
In the transformation of advanced democracies, along
with the erosion of traditional cleavage politics, a feel-
ing of detachment, distrust, and opposition has gradually
developed towards the political class and mainstream
parties (Bornschier, 2010; Kriesi et al., 2012). This senti-
ment can take the form of apathy, with electoral absten-
tion, and protest, with the birth of anti-establishment
parties. Due to the ability of cartel parties to maintain
institutional and government political ‘dominance,’ the
challenge of a growing anti-establishment attitude has
helped a large ‘galaxy’ of anti-political-establishment par-
ties and populist anti-parties to emerge (Abedi, 2004;
Mudde, 1996; Schedler, 1996; Viviani, 2019). The birth
of these parties in European societies and democracies
refers to the dynamics, on the one hand, of the trans-
formation of mainstream parties into personalised catch-
all parties, progressively inserted within state institu-
tions as “public utilities” (van Biezen, 2004) and, on the
other hand, to the process which began in the 1960s
and 1970s and created a plan for anti-establishment con-
flict with the new left’s New Politics season, the new
right’s silent counter-revolution, and finally the emer-
gence of New Populism following the 2008 economic
crisis and the impacts of globalisation. This process has
as its unitary matrix the political crisis of legitimising
representative democracies but has nevertheless pro-
duced different outcomes not only between Western
European democracies and Southern European democ-
racies, but also within the same areas. In the three case
studies examined—France, Spain, and Italy—the emer-
gence of new parties responds to variables relating to
the political system format, the type of political cul-
ture, the type of institutional system and electoral laws,
and the effects of the economic crisis from 2008 on-
wards (Kriesi & Hutter, 2019; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015). This
results in different types of new parties, in particular:
a) parties of the new populist right—Marine Le Pen’s
Front National, Matteo Salvini’s League, and the Spanish
party Vox; b) parties of the new populist left—Pablo
Iglesias’ Podemos and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France
Insoumise; and c) anti-party parties like M5S, whose het-
erogeneous social bases give them the character of a
“catch-all anti-party party” and “post-modern and post-
ideological (non)party” (Bordignon & Ceccarini, 2015;
Ceccarini & Bordignon, 2016). As regards the party trans-
formation process and the topic of post-representative
politics, the two most relevant cases are Podemos and
M5S. Despite their differences in terms of founding mo-
ments, the construction of their representative claim,
and the type of political culture they express, they nev-
ertheless exhibit some comparable aspects. In particu-
lar, both parties can be traced back to movement parties
(della Porta, Fernández, Kouki, & Mosca, 2017; Kitschelt,
2006), i.e., networks of groups and individuals who share
an identity and pursue social transformation objectives
that hybridise with the organised forms of seeking elec-
toral consensus (and power) specific to the parties, im-
plementing a series of participation repertoires which
emerge from traditional party procedures, even when
they manage to gain access to government positions.
As with mainstream parties, personalised leadership is
decisive for movement parties, contributing and defin-
ing not only their organizational structure, but their very
nature. If, in fact, the development of these parties falls
within the scope of post-bureaucratic electoral parties,
their form of leadership sits in a continuum, the two
ends ofwhich are forms of charismatic leadership, froma
neo-patrimonial character up to the opposite extreme of
movement parties that privilege assembly forms of hori-
zontality from below in the role of spokesman (Kitschelt,
2006, p. 281). With Podemos and M5S, the role of per-
sonalised leadership is a unifying trait, albeit for M5S it
passed from a phase of the leader-centred party based
around Beppe Grillo to fragmentation of the leadership
itself, with a leader–guarantor (Grillo), a leader–creator–
owner (Casaleggio, father, and later son), and the leader
in public office (Di Maio), even without institutionalis-
ing the party. Despite the different development trajec-
tories, both parties can be traced back to the ‘move-
ment digital party,’ not only for the forms of disinter-
mediation made possible by the internet, but also for
introducing digital platforms to encourage participatory
and decision-making processes. This is particularly true
for M5S’ adoption of the Rousseau Platform (owned by
the Rousseau Association directed by Davide Casaleggio)
and Podemos’ use of Loomio as an open-source platform.
We want to highlight that we use the term ‘platform’
in connection with a movement party, as a specific de-
velopment of a party subtype that associates the iden-
tity and organizational characteristics of the movement
party with the digital platform proper of a connective
party (Bennett, Segerberg, & Knüpfer, 2018). It is correct
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to remember, however, that the concept of platform has
been used in different ways, in reference to:
(a) the new frontiers of digital capitalism (Srnicek,
2017) as well as the new (and sometimes disturb-
ing) working methods coordinated by algorithms;
(b) digital participation architectures, whether they
are those adopted in open government procedures or
whether they are used as support for deliberative pro-
cesses; (c) new forms of political organization, as in
the case of the digital parties; and (d) the digital re-
organization of the state. (De Blasio & Sorice, 2019,
p. 5727)
Here we refer to the concept of platform as new form
of political organization. Alongside the organizational di-
mension, the most significant divergences between the
two digital movement parties (M5S and Podemos) con-
cern their relationship with political identity and their
specific version of populism. In this sense, Podemos is
part of the new left parties against austerity, with a pop-
ulist political strategy (that does not mean it can sic et
simpliciter be defined a populist party) and a platform
of policies attributable to the new radical left (Damiani,
2020; della Porta et al., 2017). In the case of M5S, the
change in the party has undergone various stages of de-
velopment, from its origins as environmentalist move-
ment parties to becoming a ‘pure’ populist anti-parties
party (Tarchi, 2015). Unlike the other populist and anti-
establishment parties found in France, Spain, and Italy,
M5S is the expression of ‘civic populism,’ a non-party
party that moves in an openly post-representative politi-
cal dimension. It takes to extremes the power of control,
veto, and judgement proper to monitory democracy and
counter-democracy, and as such radically overcomes the
distinction between the elite and the people by portray-
ing the ‘people entering the institutions.’
Observing the new anti-establishment parties found
in France, Spain, and Italy from an organizational and
identity point of view, different configurations can be
identified as developing between populist parties of the
new radical right and digital populist movement parties.
Nevertheless, these organizations share the same oppo-
sition to mainstream parties and also the central role of
leadership in defining the political strategy and political
identity of the party.
5. Digital, Platform, and Networked Parties
Over the past few years, a broad discussion has devel-
oped on the emergence of digital parties or platform
parties; on the other hand, the same uncertainty about
the use of the two (sometimes overlapping) terms high-
lights the complexity of the matter. Paolo Gerbaudo
(2019) made use of the expression “digital party,” also
identifying the fundamental characteristics of its orga-
nizational pattern; from a different perspective, how-
ever, Marco Deseriis (2020) argues for the existence
of two different models of platform party. The first
one, which is essentially in continuity (although partial)
with the parties that preceded it and which innovates
through the use of digital technologies for participation;
and the second one, appropriately defined as a “net-
worked party”, would present the following characteris-
tics: non-exclusivemembership, decentralization, leader-
ship function, a bottom-up division of labour, collective
agenda setting, hybrid participation, and scalable delib-
eration (Deseriis, 2020, p. 907).
The relationships between digital technologies for
participation and organizational methods constitute a
non-secondary aspect in the analysis on the transforma-
tion of parties. There are many political parties of dif-
ferent orientations which adopt platforms of democratic
participation; significantly, however, the wealth of possi-
bilities for online deliberation remains confined to a few
exceptions. It is no coincidence that even the “networked
party” model, as described by Deseriis (2020), finds in
the “scalable deliberation” one of its qualifying aspects,
but, nevertheless, it is quite well applied in marginal
political formations, albeit culturally and socially signifi-
cant. Experiences as the X-Party (which significantly de-
fine themselves as a “método para el control ciudadano
de las instituciones,” that is, a method for the citizens’
control of the institutions; Partido X, n.d.) and some na-
tional groups framed within the Pirate Parties (namely
German, Icelandic, and Swedish) appear very interesting
from the researchers’ perspective for their connection
with the social movements’ networks and their capacity
to mobilise people through the digital ecosystem. At the
same time, they do not have the same political impact as
parties such as Podemos in Spain or Five Star Movement
in Italy.
The conceptual clash between ‘platform/digital
party’ and ‘networked party’ is based upon several key-
words but it finds a point of clear distinction in the role
of leadership and in the two oppositional models of in-
volvement (plebiscitarianism vs collective agenda set-
ting). The differences between a platform party and a
networked party, as defined by Deseriis (2020, p. 908)
are presented in Table 1.
In other works (see, for example, De Blasio & Sorice,
2020) platform parties are studied as the outcome of a
participatory logic even if they emerge as results of the
hyper-representation phenomena. In essence, platform
parties use technology as an organizational mode and a
structural architecture (of a stratarchical type), but only
at a secondary level are the participatory platforms used
for policy-making procedures and to increase participa-
tory (and scalable) forms of deliberation.
In Figure 1 we have tried to highlight the charac-
teristics of the three party models: from the ‘classic’
one, the mass integration party as it developed mainly
though not exclusively in the area of socialist tradition,
to the platform party up to the variant represented by
the networked party. According to Marco Deseriis, net-
worked parties:
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Table 1. The keywords of platform party and networked party.
Platform Party Networked Party
Membership growth Non-exclusive membership
Delocalization Decentralization
Hyper-leadership Leadership function
Superbase Bottom-up division of labour
Plebiscitarianism Collective agenda setting
Disintermediation Hybrid participation
Distributed centralization Scalable deliberation
Source: Deseriis (2020, p. 908).
Advance a model of digital party that leverages the
decentralized affordances of the Internet to make the
party line (and the relative division of labor) emerge
from the network itself.…whereas the network form
is by its very nature flexible, open ended, and recep-
tive to the inputs that come from the social body, the
party form is hierarchical, structured, partisan, and
thus less permeable to the heterogeneity of the so-
cial. Whereas platform parties have solved this ten-
sion by delegating to their leaders the task of symbol-
izing the unity of the party, networked parties have
bet on the capacity of networks to display emergent
and self-organizing properties. (Deseriis, 2020, p. 913)
Both the platform party and the networked party can
claim commonality with social movements and their
democratic practices of communication. We have to un-
derline, however, that the common place idea, here is
that themovementswould always be horizontal, without
a hierarchical structure and without a leader, by virtue
of the fact that they would borrow not only the dynam-
ics of transmitting messages but also the modalities of
the adoption of decisions. Following the influential study
of Donatella della Porta and Dieter Rucht (2013), it can
be useful to remember that in many cases the collec-
tive dimension of the protest is organised and staged
by an elite group of activists. In our opinion, it is impor-
tant to underline the difference between the movement
parties (della Porta et al., 2017) and direct social action
(Bosi & Zamponi, 2019). If the first ones can constitute
the background of some platform parties, there is no ev-
idence that the second can represent the source for net-
worked parties.
The studies on platform parties and on its variant of
networked parties are the result of a long reflection on
the transformation of the political parties, as we have ex-
plained in Sections 1 and 2. In particular, wewould like to
underline that the rhetoric of participation (the so-called
“participationism,” see Sorice, 2019) has always accom-
panied the emergence of new organizational forms of
Mass integraon party
• Party of people
• Party of cadres
• Principle of delegaon
• Diffused vercal structure
• (secons)
• Collecve concepon of
• parcipaon
Plaorm party
• Super-people (acvists)
• Substanal absence of
• cadres
• Hyper-representaon
• (charismac leader)
• Stratarchical structure
• Individualisc concepon
• of parcipaon
Networked party
• Party of acvists
• Decentralised
• organizaon
• Diffused leadership
• Horizontal organizaon
• Hybrid parcipaon
Figure 1. Characteristics of the mass party, platform party, and networked party.
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politics, although such rhetoric has been very often re-
duced to a generic ’openness to society’ and program-
matically refuses an internal organization based on de-
liberative and participatory logics. At this stage, the use
of a really scalable deliberative practice could constitute
an important element of newness in the parties rooted
in the use of digital tools and, inmany cases, fully framed
in the digital ecosystem. Technologies, indeed:
Respond efficiently to three different tendencies of
contemporary politics. In fact, they can: a) influence
the organizational models of participation; b) accel-
erate the processes of deconstruction of intermedi-
ary bodies; c) feed the perspective of liquid democ-
racy (a really controversial concept, usually overlap-
ping with that of “delegative democracy”—a merging
of representative and direct democracy—based upon
the use of digital platforms). (De Blasio & Sorice, 2020,
pp. 92–93)
6. Digital Ecosystem, Political Parties, and the
Transformation of Public Sphere
In the three countries under examination (France, Italy,
Spain), we observed the organization and use of digital
tools of parties of different political spectrum. In particu-
lar, we investigated the cases of La France Insoumise and
La République en Marche (LaREM) in France, Podemos
and Vox in Spain, and Five Star Movement and the
League in Italy.
The first element to underline is the existence, in
some cases, of co-ordinated digital actions, not organ-
ised around a participatory platform, that constitute a
minority in the total number of technologies employed
(except for the cases of Podemos in Spain and Five Star
Movement in Italy). The digital tools are usually func-
tional tomobilisation practices andwork essentially as el-
ements of support for political communication. Podemos
was over time transformed from a party-platform to a
party that uses a platform, and this transformation is
more evident since the party took responsibility in the
national government. Vox presents a traditional orga-
nization and many digital tools are used, but they are
basically focused on creating consensus and/or promot-
ing mobilisation.
In France, the ‘participatory programme’ experi-
ments launched by La France Insoumise move from the
level of mobilisation to spaces where concrete propos-
als are developed, and active deliberation processes take
place. La France Insoumise, in any regard, cannot be de-
fined as a platform party: it merges together a territorial
organization with the use of digital tools. In particular, its
‘Platform of Action’ is a tool for policy proposal and politi-
cal debate. The platform gives people the chance toman-
age their personal agenda and opens a space of engage-
ment for the activist to whom it also offers the possibil-
ity to check the eventual action groups with which they
are registered. There are also data on current and past
initiatives as well as all the reports of the activities be-
ing organised. The platform, however, does not present a
decision-making space in which participants can vote on
programmes; in this aspect, it is very different from the
use that the Five Star Movement (in Italy) makes of its
platform (Rousseau), which instead presents spaces for
the proposal of and voting on specific policies or on orga-
nizational aspects of the party’s life. From this perspec-
tive, if the Five Star Movement can be placed, with some
caution, among the “platform parties” (seeMosca, 2018,
who states that Five Star Movement should be framed in
the area of the “technopopulist parties,” and De Blasio
& Sorice, 2018), La France Insoumise is a cross between
an updated re-edition of the mass integration parties
and the ‘networked party.’ The movement-party LaREM
(a renaming of the En Marche movement launched by
Emmanuel Macron in 2016 for the Presidential Election
of 2017) is another example of cross-over: it presents,
in fact, an horizontal structure, strongly decentralised
but, at the same time, with a strong leadership and with-
out a specific digital platform of political decision mak-
ing. The analysis of the LaREM’s activists presented by
Bruno Cautrès, Marc Lazar, Thierry Pech, and Thomas
Vitiello (2019) provides a wealth of information on the
‘marcheurs’ and on the party’s organization. The recent
reorganization of the party’s structure at the end of
2019 confirms the idea of a party horizontal in its or-
ganization, well rooted in the digital culture, but not
proactive in the use of digital platforms. At the same
time, it is useful to remember that LaREM has been us-
ing a platform-website based upon the ‘NationBuilder
Tool’ (NationBuilder is a web architecture managed by
Tectonica, https://www.tectonica.co, a company that
uses a technopolitical approach to democracy; see also
https://nationbuilder.com/network). It is a collaborative
and flexible platform also used on different occasions by
the Scottish National Party, the Women’s Equality Party
of the UK, the Belgian and Norwegian Green Parties, the
UK Labour Party, and others.
Table 2 summarizes how the different analysed par-
ties use digital tools. Table 3 shows the use of spe-
cific participatory platforms (Podemos’ Particìpa, Five
Star Movement’s Rousseau, and La France Insoumise’s
Platform of Action).
In Italy, the League is a particular case of a party
strongly present on social media, with a great capac-
ity to activate people through the ‘news engagement’
technique (Giglietto, Valeriani, Righetti, &Marino, 2019),
but with a total absence of digital participation struc-
tures. From an organizational point of view, the Lega
Nord party (Northern League then only Lega—League—
since 2018) is connected to a parallel movement, the
League for Salvini Premier, founded in 2018,whose struc-
tures coincide with those of the party. This situation
determines the online presence of two different web-
sites (leganord.org and legaonline.it). At the beginning
of 2020, Salvini’s movement has put the old Northern
League under controlled management, effectively de-
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Table 2. Use of digital tools.
Policy Policy Decision Organizational
Country Parties proposals Mobilisation making making tool
France La France Insoumise * YES YES NO NO YES
LaREM NO YES NO NO YES
Spain Podemos * YES YES YES YES YES
Vox NO YES NO NO Partly
Italy Five Star Movement * YES YES YES YES YES
League NO YES NO NO NO
Note: * Use of a participatory platform (see also Table 3).
Table 3. Characteristics of the participatory platforms used by La France Insoumise, Podemos, and the Five StarMovement.
Space for Policy Procedures for Deliberative Organization Is platform the only
Parties and Platforms activists proposals policy making tools tools organization tool?
La France Insoumise YES YES NO NO YES NO
Platform of Action
Podemos YES YES YES YES YES NO
Particìpa
Five Star Movement YES YES YES NO YES NO
Rousseau
creeing its end despite the fact that it continues to exist
for issues related to legal problems.
The complex relationships between digital ecosys-
tems and political parties bring about a transformation
in the role of parties within the public sphere. The devel-
opment of platform parties has highlighted the dynamics
of fragmentation of representation and the emergence
of forms of “direct representation” (De Blasio & Sorice,
2019). In this context, the role of media ecosystems is of
fundamental importance for: a) the legitimization of the
hyper-leader as hyper-representative; b) building credi-
bility of occasional forms of representation (which only
in the context of the media—broadcasting and social
media—take on significant social value); and c) the social
diffusion of direct representationmechanisms (which ex-
ist only by virtue of an exchange activated in the first in-
stance by the media and online political communities).
The online public sphere, in fact very stratified, once
again constitutes a space of conflict and, in many cases,
of manipulation.
The transformation of political parties does not
constitute—as is sometimes simplistically said—their
dissolution; the emergence of platform/digital parties
and/or networked parties and even hybrid aggrega-
tions are, if anything, evidence of the transformation
of the same dynamics and procedures of political rep-
resentation. The multiple forms of interaction between
movements and parties, as well as the processes of re-
politicization through movements, are other evidences
of the transformations taking place. In this context, dig-
ital activism acts as a modality of reorganization of con-
sensus, development of mobilization, and redefinition of
the forms and modes of representation.
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